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I. INTRODUCTION

On February 17, 2014, after a year of investigation, the Commission
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) submitted its report concluding that the range of human
rights violations being committed in the State amounts to crimes against
humanity.' In the recommendations of the report, the Commission
referred to two frameworks: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the
International Criminal Court (ICC). It stressed that the international
community must accept its responsibility to protect the people of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which the State's own
government has manifestly failed to do, and to act in a "timely and
decisive manner" in accordance with the third pillar of the R2P.2 The
Commission also urged that those most responsible for the crimes against
humanity committed in the DPRK be held accountable, specifically
noting either referral of the situation to the ICC by the U.N. Security
Council or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal by the United Nations
as options to achieve this end.3 Although the recommendations have not
yet been implemented in practice, they have triggered increasing concern
in the international community over the human rights situation in the
DPRK. Signaling the imperative necessity of improvement in the
situation, they also provide the scheme of possible response and measures
that could be taken by the international community.
Recently, R2P and the ICC together have formed the set of potential
responses of the international community when called upon to address
human rights violations which amount to mass atrocity. R2P facilitates
gathering the political will of the international community in a prompt
response to protect people at risk, while the ICC provides a juridical
mechanism to punish those who commit such crimes. 4 These frameworks
are assumed to be mutually supportive, with the ultimate purpose of
protecting human rights. 5 It is illustrative that the cases of Libya and C6te
d'Ivoire (the most notable instances of implementation of R2P in practice
in 2011) were both dealt with, or at least partly considered, in the ICC. In
2012, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stressed that the threat of
referral to the ICC and its engagement in response to the alleged
perpetration of crimes can contribute to the overall response in
1. Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
DemocraticPeople'sRepublic ofKorea, 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014).
2. Id. 86.
3. Id.
87, 94(a).
4. Kurt Mills, The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court:
Complementary or Conflicting?, 4 ASIA PAC. CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT (AP R2P) BRIEF 1, 2-3

(2014).
5.

Id. at 4.
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implementing R2P.6 Despite such emphasis or assumption on the
relationship between the two frameworks, the extent to which---or the
grounds upon which-referral to the ICC may, or can, contribute to
implementing R2P in the overall response has not been fully scrutinized,
and remains as anecdotic discourse.
This Article aims to discuss the relationship between the ICC and
R2P, focusing on the role of the ICC in implementing R2P. It will first
examine the evolution of R2P and the ICC respectively, and actual cases
that relate these two frameworks to each other. After examining their
common threads and features, it will then seek to situate the ICC as one
of the mechanisms for the implementation of R2P. The ICC will be
considered with the three components encompassed in R2P
implementation-the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react,
and the responsibility to rebuild. This Article also attempts to find the
implications of the works of the ICC in consolidating the normative
framework of R2P, under the presumption that a solid normative
framework would enhance and facilitate implementation per se. With
regard to its application in practice in three distinctive cases (Libya, C6te
d'Ivoire, and the DPRK) this Article will address the potential positive
and negative interactions between R2P and the ICC. It will conclude with
reflections on the future of R2P, in relation to its interrogation of the ICC.
II. NORMATIVE

AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 21ST

CENTURY: Two FRAMEWORKS AGAINST ATROCITY CRIMES

R2P and the ICC are both relatively recent developments representing
efforts of the international community to prevent and stop mass atrocities,
and to enhance human rights protection mechanisms. R2P is regarded as
"the most dramatic normative development of our time" 7 and its
endorsement is considered as signifying and reshaping the new
international legal order based on the principle of humanity. 8 Going
beyond the normative and political discourses of R2P, the ICC provides
an institution directly designed to punish perpetrators internationally, and
thereby seeks to prevent future atrocity crimes. 9 Both frameworks were
6. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response,
29, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012) [hereinafter Responsibility to Protect:Timely
and Decisive Response].
7. Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G. Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm - and Action?, I
GLOBAL R2P 22, 22 (2009).
8. Anne Peters, Humanity as the 4 and 9 of Sovereignty, 20 EuR. J.INT'L L. 513, 514

(2009) (noting the endorsement of R2P as ousting "the principle of sovereignty from its position
as a Letztbegrundung (first principle) of international law," and arguing that the principle of

humanity is now foundation and telos of State sovereignty).
9.

Mills, supra note 4, at 1.
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tied into the human rights project of the millennium century, representing
"the highest reaches of global geopolitics."' 0 Their emergence also
represented a response to the problems of liberal interventionism of the
late 1990s."1 Before going on to discuss their relationship, the following
section attempts to pinpoint the precise meaning of R2P and the ICC in
international law.
A. Responsibility to Protect
It has already been sixteen years since the International Commission
on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the concept of
R2P. 12 Initially conceived by the ICISS in 2001, R2P has become an
agenda for the international community, through its inclusion in the
report prepared by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change titled A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility,]3 and
again in the U.N. Secretary-General's report, In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All. 14 In 2005,
more than 150 heads of State and Government affirmed their commitment
to R2P by incorporating its basic principles in paragraphs 138 to 139 of
the World Summit Outcome Document, which was endorsed by
consensus at the U.N. General Assembly. 15 Since then, the U.N. Security
Council has also adopted a number of resolutions which explicitly refer
to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document, otherwise directly
quoting the phrases within, endorsing the basic principle of R2P. 16 The
United Nations was the forum used for consolidating the consensus upon
the concept of R2P, while the existing discourse on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict provided an avenue for furthering its
discussion. 17 In 2009, the Secretary-General published a report titled
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.i" This report is significant
10. Id.
11. See David Chandler, Born Posthumously: Rethinking the SharedCharacteristicsof the
ICC and R2P, 21 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 5, 8-9 (2010).
12. See INT'L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION & ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INT'L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001)

[hereinafter ICISS Report].
13. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 201,
203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
14. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, 35, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (May 26, 2005).
15. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome
138-139 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter
2005 World Summit Outcome].
16. S.C. Res. 1674, 4 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1706 (Aug. 31 2006); S.C. Res. 1894
(Nov. 11, 2009).
17. Yejoon Rim, The Evolution of "Responsibility to Protect" and its Implicationsfor
InternationalLaw, 40 KOREA INT'L L. REV. 149, 151-56 (2014).
18. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc.
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because it clarifies the concept and principle of R2P, and concretizes the
implementation through a three-pillar approach, which fortify the
foundation of R2P implementation. 19 Accordingly, R2P has arrived at a
turning point marking a shift in focus away from the conceptual toward
the practical implementation of the norm.R2P has since been developed
through annual reports of the Secretary-General focusing on the detailed
implementation of R2P.2 °
Discourse over R2P has evolved in three stages: (1) accepting the
concept as a subject of international public discourse, (2) shaping
concrete implementation mechanisms, and (3) reappraising the concept
vis-ii-vis its application in practice. 2 1 R2P reaffirms the primary
responsibility of the sovereign State as innate in the concept of
sovereignty, while emphasizing the residual responsibility of the
international community to protect a population from threats of genocide,
22
R2P
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
the
emphasizing
by
mechanism
protection
enhances the human rights
the
primary responsibility of the sovereign State, even while requiring
international community to assist the State in this duty. 23 The first pillar
of R2P implementation affirms the sovereign State's responsibility in that
"each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. 2 4 The second pillar affirms the role of the international
community in assisting States to protect their populations from these
crimes, and helping them build their capacity. 25 The third pillar provides
for taking collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
26
Security Council, in accordance with the U.N. Charter. As noted by the
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect].
19. Rim, supra note 17, at 157.
20. See U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to
Protect, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010); U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and
Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/65/877S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011); Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note
6; U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect. State Responsibility and Prevention, U.N.
Doc. A/67/929-S/2013/399 (July 9, 2013); U.N. Secretary-General, Fulfilling Our Collective
Responsibility: InternationalAssistance and the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/68/947S/2014/449 (July 11, 2014); U.N. Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment:
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,U.N. Doc. A/69/981-S/2015/500 (July 13, 2015).
21. Rim, supra note 17, at 151-63.
22. Id.at 156.
23. Id
138; Implementing the
24. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 15,
13-27.
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 18,
138; Implementing the
25. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 15,
28-48.
Responsibility to Protect,supra note 18,
139; Implementing the
26. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 15,
49-66.
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 18,
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Secretary-General in 2011, the critical question is not whether there exists
27
a principle of R2P per se, but concerns implementation of the principle.
R2P is not an entirely new concept, and has not emerged abruptly.
Rather, the concept grounds itself on the changing conceptions of security
and sovereignty, which reinterpret the necessity, and possibility of
intervention. 28 R2P reflects the increasing concern for security, and thus
the growing necessity for reconciliation of the principles of sovereignty
and intervention. Neither is R2P another name for humanitarian
intervention. 29 Based on the reinterpretation of "sovereignty as
responsibility,, 30 R2P attempts to change the discourse over intervention
from right to responsibility. Moreover, R2P extends the scope of
protection by denoting a continuum of responsibilities in maintaining
international peace and security, and expands the scope of assistance.
External involvement is facilitated and systematized vis-ti-vis principles
of R2P. The very meaning of R2P resides in its extended concern on the
protection of civilians, not only during a conflict but also before and after
it. Although there remains tension and challenge at the heart of
operationalizing R2P in practice, it has already played a significant role
in shaping international debates on human rights and humanitarian
response. Regardless of whether R2P per se has become a norm in
international law, denoting "responsibility to protect" certainly facilitates
the determination of the international community to take deep
consideration on the situation and respond accordingly. By pushing other
States to be mindful of their "responsibility" in relation to the situation of
human rights abuses, R2P magnetizes the attention of the international
community, beyond the reason of State interests or an immediate direct
threat to the State, toward the solidarity of the international community
for the protection of fundamental human rights.
B. InternationalCriminalCourt
The ICC is a permanent institution having power to exercise its
27. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at Breakfast Roundtable with Foreign Ministers on
The Responsibility to Protect: Responding to the Imminent Threats of Mass Atrocities (Sept. 23,
2011), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2011-09-23/secretary-generals-remarks-

breakfast-roundtable-foreign-ministers.
28.

Yejoon Rim, A Study on the Responsibility to Protect in International Law 8 (June

2008) (unpublished thesis for Masters Degree, Korea University).
29.

U.N. Press Release, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies "Responsibility to Protect"

at Berlin Event on "Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World,"
U.N. Press Release SG/SM/I 1701 (July 15, 2008), https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sgsm
l1701.doc.htm.

30. See FRANCIS M. DENG, SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
AFRICA (1996) (characterizing sovereignty as responsibility, while furthering the idea to the
meaning of responsibility toward the international community). Rim, supra note 28, at 71.
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jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern, and is complementary to national jurisdiction. 3 1 Based on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) adopted
in 1998 at the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the ICC
court was established to eradicate impunity for the perpetrators of the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community, with the
intention of filling the conspicuous gaps in international criminal justice.
Article 27 of the Rome Statue explicitly indicates that royalty, heads of
State, and other officials are not exempt from its jurisdiction; there is no
immunity for individuals before the ICC. 32 It can also prosecute non-State
actors such as rebel group leaders. Moreover, "the [S]tatute allows for
criminal proceedings to be initiated, not only by states and the Security
Council, but also by the ICC prosecutor independently." 33 The ICC may
assert jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and aggression, when a situation is referred to the Prosecutor either by a
State party or by the Security Council, 34or in case of a proprio motu
investigation, initiated by the Prosecutor.
The creation of a permanent criminal court was not the result of a
short-term aspiration on the part of the international community. An
initial effort to establish such a permanent criminal court had been
proposed in the early 1950s. 3 ' However, political and diplomatic realities
in the Cold War era stalled its progress. With the end of the Cold War,
and witnessing the tragedies in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the
need for creation of a permanent institution was accentuated. Whereas
the former ad hoc tribunals were designed to deal with a specific situation
with limited temporal and territorial jurisdiction, the ICC is potentially
universal in territorial jurisdiction and has continuing temporal
jurisdiction. 36 Thus, adoption of the Rome Statute signified an important
in the quest to prevent atrocity crimes of international
development
37
concern.
When the ICC was established in 2002 along with the 60th ratification
of the State, it was considered as a remarkable institutional development
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, openedfor signature July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
32. Id.art. 27.
33. ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND,
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME TO THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION

AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 23 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS, TiE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].

34. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 5, 6, 7, 8 & 13.
35. In 1950, the U.N. General Assembly established a committee charged with drafting the
status of an international criminal court. G.A. Res. 489(V), Dec. 12, 1950. See WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 9

(2007).

36. James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of
Atrocities: Predictingthe Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).

37.

Id. at2.
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for the protection of human rights in the 21 st century. At the same time,
it was also a challenging opportunity to probe the possibilities for
international law to reduce human suffering from atrocity crimes.3 8 In the
absence of an enforcing mechanism to penetrate the sovereign boundary,
they must instead rely upon a domestic law enforcement mechanism to
arrest those charged; the task of the ICC is deemed inherently difficult,
while its goal to attain peace and security vis-ti-vis achieving justice is
ambitious. 39 Nonetheless, the establishment of the ICC confirms that
States' resolve that serious crimes "must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national
level and by enhancing international co-operation." 40
C. Linking R2P and the ICC in Practice
1. Libya
Since 2011 there have already been a number of cases in which the
U.N. Security Council called upon the respective governments' primary
responsibility to protect their population. 4 1 Many of these cases have not
been given sufficient attention, as the Security Council only called upon
the primary responsibility of sovereign States. Only a few cases went
further to request the international community to act in accordance with
its secondary responsibilities via the Security Council. Among those
cases in which the international community considered the situation
under R2P, Libya was the only one in which the Security Council directly
referred the situation to the ICC, thereby linking the ICC in the course of
R2P implementation.
R2P and the ICC can be invoked together, either in sequence or
simultaneously. In the case of Libya, international intervention within the
R2P framework and the prosecution of the ICC went together. In the
course of the 2011 Libyan Civil War, the Gaddafi government's use of
lethal force against civilians raised the grave concern of the international
community. Condemning the violence that might amount to crimes
against humanity, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1970 on February 26, 2011, "recalling the Libyan authority's
38.

Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the InternationalCriminalCourt DeterAtrocity?,

70 INT'L ORG. 443, 443-44 (2016).
39. Id.
40. Rome Statute, supra note 3 1, pmbl.
41. Some of these governments include: Yemen, S.C. Res. 2014, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2014
(Oct. 21, 2011); Mali, S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012), S.C. Res. 2100,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/2100 (Apr. 25, 2013); Somalia, S.C. Res. 2093, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2093 (Mar.
6, 2013); Central African Republic, S.C. Res. 2121, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2121 (Oct. 10, 2013), S.C.
Res. 2127 (Dec. 5, 2013), S.C. Res. 2134 (Jan. 28, 2014), S.C. Res. 2149 (Apr. 10, 2014); and
South Sudan, S.C. Res. 1996 (Jul. 8, 2011), S.C. Res. 2155 (May 27, 2014).
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responsibility to protect its population."4' 2 Acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council decided to refer the situation in
Libya since February 15, 2011 to the ICC Prosecutor, stressing "the need
to hold to account those responsible for attacks, including by forces under
their control, on civilians."'43 This was the second referral by the Security
Council (the first being Darfur44), but the first to be passed unanimously.
Based on the given authority and the existing evidence obtained from a
preliminary examination, and concluding there was reasonable basis to
believe that crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction had been committed in
Libya, the ICC Prosecutor decided to open an investigation of this
situation on March 3, 2011. 4 5 Meanwhile, on March 17, 2011, the
Security Council went on to adopt Resolution 1973 authorizing Member
States to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian46
populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, including Benghazi.
While the international community has been enacting its responsibility to
protect civilians suffering from atrocity crimes in Libya, the procedure of
the ICC has continued. On May 16, 2011, the ICC Prosecutor filed
warrants for the arrest of Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi,
Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Senussi who were accused of
planning and implementing "widespread and systemic attacks against a
civilian population, in particular demonstrators and alleged dissidents" in
the course of the 2011 Libya uprising. 47 The prosecution accused these
three men of using the Libyan armed forces as agents in allegedly
detaining, torturing, and killing hundreds of civilians in an attempt to
suppress the demonstration against Gaddafi's authoritarian rule. 48 On
June 27, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued warrants for their arrest and
ordered the men to stand trial at the Hague for human rights abuses
pursuant to its prosecutorial power. 49 Accordingly, the ICC exercised
jurisdiction over the situation in Libya under Article 13(b) of the Rome
9(Feb. 26, 2011).

42.

S.C. Res. 1970,

43.

Id. at

44.

S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).

45.

ICC, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the U.N.

10.

Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), 22, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
A077E5F8-29B6-4A78-9EAB-AI79A 105738E/0/lJNSCLibyaReportEng 04052011 .pdf.
4 (Mar. 17, 2011). Adopted without veto, abstentions by Brazil,
46. S.C. Res. 1973,
China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation. See U.N. Press Release, Security Council
Approves "No-Fly Zone" over Libya, Authorizing "All Necessary Measures" to Protect Civilians,
by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Doc. SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011),
https://www.un.org/press/en/201 1/sc 10200.doc.htm
47. Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu
Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah AL-SENUSSI, 2, Situations in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/1 1, Decision approving arrest warrant (June 27, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_06155.PDF.
12,14,17,20&27.
48. Id.

49.

Id. 41.
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Statute, which allows it to investigate and prosecute cases in States that
have not ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute on the basis of a Security
Council referral.5 °
2. C6te d'Ivoire
Together with the Security Council Resolution of 1973 adopted on the
situation of Libya, Resolution 1975 on the situation of C6te d'Ivoire is
regarded as authorizing the military response to protect civilians under
the R2P principle. 5 1 Given the widespread concern of the international
community over the post-election crisis in C6te d'Ivoire, including the
active responses of regional organizations, it was not difficult to predict
the adoption of the resolution authorizing military intervention in the
52
situation of escalating massive human rights abuses in C6te d'Ivoire.
However, beyond the traditional argument contingent on the
humanitarian crisis situation triggering international intervention,
Resolution 1975 went further, including a noteworthy phrase in its
preamble: "reaffirming the primary responsibility of each State to protect
civilians." 53 Meanwhile, by indicating the primary responsibility of the
State, it implicitly refers to the existence of the secondary responsibility
of the international community in accordance with R2P principle. Thus,
under the circumstance of the sovereign State which holds primary
responsibility being "unable or unwilling" to protect the people, the
international community should take steps, not as its "right" but in
50. LIBYA: FROM REPRESSION TO REVOLUTION: A RECORD OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS 2011-2013, 355 (M. Cherif. Bassiouni ed., 2013). Since then,
the arrest warrant against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi was withdrawn due to his
death on 22 November 2011. Situation in Libya, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya. Proceedings
against Abdullah Al-Senussi before the ICC terminated on July 24, 2014 when the Appeals
Chamber confirmed a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I declaring the inadmissibility of the case
before the ICC. Id.The case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi remains in the Pre-Trial stage, pending
his transfer to the seat of the Court. Id. The Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the challenge to the
admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, concluding that Libya was unable
genuinely to carry out the prosecution of him. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/1 I01/1I, Decision on the non-compliance by Libya with requests for cooperation by the Court and
referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council (Dec. 10, 2014). The Pre-Trial Chamber issued
a finding of non-compliance by the Government of Libya, and referred the matter to the U.N.
Security Council. Id. As of July 2016, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi is not in custody of the ICC. Id.
51. S.C. Res. 1975, 12 (Mar. 30, 2011).
52. For a discussion regarding the factual background of the post-election crisis in C6te
d'Ivoire, see Yejoon Rim, Two Governments and One Legitimacy: InternationalResponses to the
Post-ElectionCrisis in C6te d'Ivoire, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 683, 684-89 (2012).
53. S.C. Res. 1975, supra note 51,
9. Indeed, this phrase draws our attention because it
implies the Council's intention to consider the specific situation within the R2P framework, albeit
in an oblique way. The resolution stresses the responsibility to protect civilians ascribed to the
concept of sovereignty, even if for some sovereign States such reiteration is axiomatic thus might
be deemed redundancy.
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enactment of its secondary "responsibility." The Secretary-General
commented that what happened in C6te d'Ivoire was "a historic
precedent, a watershed in the emerging doctrine of the responsibility to
protect.'54
At that time, C6te d'Ivoire was not a Party to the Rome Statute; but
had only signed the Statute. 5 5 On April 18, 2003, C6te d'Ivoire had
lodged a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statue accepting
the jurisdiction of the Court for crimes committed in its territory since the
events of September 19, 2002 and, additionally, "for an unspecified
period of time." 56 On December 14, 2010, Alassane Ouattara, in his
capacity as newly elected President of C6te d'Ivoire, sent a letter to the
Office of the Prosecutor and the Registrar of the Court reaffirming the
CMte d'Ivoire government's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. 57 On
June 23, 2011, the ICC prosecutor requested authorization from the
Pretrial Chamber III to open an investigation in C6te d'Ivoire in relation
to post-election violence in the period following November 28, 2010
pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute (propriomuto). 58 The Pretrial
59
Chamber III granted the Prosecutor's request on October 3, 2011.
Thereupon, the ICC opened its investigation, and two arrest warrants
have been issued for Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo for alleged
crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 60 Accordingly, the case
marked the first investigation opened while a State was not yet party to
the Rome Statute (C6te d'Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute on 15 February
2013) but had accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by a declaration in
accordance with article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. 6 1 On July 27, 2011,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 2000, taking note that the ICC
prosecutor requested authorization from Pre-Trial Chamber to open an
committed
investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity
62
d'Ivoire.
C6te
in
elections
2010
28,
after the November
54. Press Release, Libya, Cte d'lvoire Events Mark Historic Precedent, Secretary-General
Tells, Sofia Platform, Citing 'Watershed' in Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/13548 (May 6, 2011), https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13548.doc.htm.
55. C6te d'lvoire ratified the Rome Statute on Feb. 15, 2013. See Situation in the Republic
of C6te d'Ivoire, ICC-02/1 1, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi.

56.

ICC, Corrigendum to "Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the

Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of C~te d'lvoire, ICC-02/1 110 (Nov. 15, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_ 18794.PDF
14-Corr,
[hereinafter ICC-02/11 -14-Corr].
57. Id. 1l.
58. Id. 2.

59.

ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an

Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of C6te d'lvoire, ICC-02/1 1-14 (Oct. 3, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_16756.PDF.
60. ICC-02/11-14-Corr, supra note 56.
61. Id. T 10.
62. See S.C. Res. 2000 (July 27, 2011). Since then, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to
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3. DPRK
The case of the DPRK illustrates the linking together of R2P and the
ICC in the responses by the international community in respect to
massive human rights violations. It also signified that these two
frameworks could be considered even in the absence of visible armed
conflicts. Indeed, it was the first case in which a Commission of Inquiry
was established in a situation without armed conflict. 63 After a year of
investigation, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that human rights
violations in the DPRK amount to "crimes against humanity" 64 and that
the United Nations must ensure that those most responsible be held
accountable. 6 5 To achieve this end, they recommended the referral of the
situation to the ICC by the Security Council, or the establishment of ad
hoc tribunals in order to ensure accountability of those responsible for
committing such crimes. 6 6 They stressed that "the international
community must discharge its responsibility to protect by pursuing a
multi-faceted strategy that combines strong accountability measures
targeting those most responsible for crimes against humanity [... ]67 On
December 18, 2014, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the resolution
on the human rights situation in the DPRK, which includes a provision
encouraging the Security Council to consider the recommendations of the
Commission of Inquiry, including the referral of the situation to the
ICC. 68 As requested by Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in the DPRK,6 9 the General Assembly again
adopted the Resolution, which includes a provision encouraging the
Security Council to continue its consideration of referral of the situation
to the ICC. 70 Since then, the focus of discussion about human rights
expand its authorization for the investigation in C6te d'Ivoire to include crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed between 19 September 2002 and 28 November
2010. Situation in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi (last visited Mar. 12). C~te d' Ivoire challenged the admissibility of the

case against Simone Gbagbo, but Pre-Trial Chamber I decided to reject the challenge. Id.This
decision is currently subject to an appeal. Id. The case against Simone Gbagbo is remained in
Pre-Trial stage, while the trial against Laurent Gbagbo and BI6 Goud6, which were joined on 11
March 2015, continues. Id.
63. Human Rights Council Res. 22/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/13,
64. Human Rights Council, supra note 1, 80.
65. Id. 87.

4 (Apr. 9, 2013).

66. Id. 94(a).
67. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry
on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
1210, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/24/CRP.I (Feb. 7,2014).
68. G.A. Res. 69/188, 8 (Dec. 18, 2014).
69. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/71 (Mar. 18, 2015).
70. G.A. Res. 70/172, 10 (Feb. 25, 2015).
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violations in the DPRK has been placed on the issue of accountability,
and examination of the feasibility of brining the situation to the ICC
continues.
4. Comparison of Three Cases
The three cases examined here show the relationship between R2P and
the ICC in practice. Libya is a case in which the Security Council decided
to refer the situation to the ICC in the course of R2P implementation.
More specifically, the referral to the ICC was made in the course of
emphasizing the first pillar and the second pillar of R2P in Resolution
1970, adopted prior to Resolution 1973 in which the Council decided to
take all necessary means, deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities'
incompliance with regard to Resolution 1970. In the case of C6te
d'Ivoire, before the Security Council considered the situation under the
R2P framework, the Government of C6te d'Ivoire initially induced an
issuance ofproprio motu by the Prosecutor of the ICC by sending a letter
reaffirming its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC during the
conflict. 7 1 The Security Council, taking note of the request of the ICC
Prosecutor for authorizing an investigation to the Pre-Trial Chamber,
called upon the Government to ensure accountability for all perpetrators
of human rights violations, as well as conditions of protection and
detention of former President Gbagbo, his wife, former officials and any
other detainees, in line with international obligations.7 2 In the case of the
DPRK, both R2P and the ICC were suggested as possible responses of
the international community, although neither has yet been implemented.

HI. COMMON

THREADS AND FEATURES:
SHARED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE R2P AND THE ICC

A. Common Subject Matter: Atrocity Crimes
The subject matter of R2P and the ICC overlap in that both
frameworks deal with situations which amount to atrocity crimes. 73 When
initially embodied in the ICISS Report, the scope of situations in which
R2P would apply was sufficiently broad as to include general situations
where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war,
71. ICC, Situation in the Republic of C6te d'lvoire, Request for Authorization of an
8 (June 23, 2011), https://www.iccInvestigation Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-02/11,
cpi.int/Court Records/CR201 I_07959.PDF.
10-11 (Jul. 27, 2011).
72. S.C. Res. 2000,
73. See David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect, 40 CASE
WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (2007) (discussing the term "atrocity crimes").
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insurgency, repression or State failure. However, subsequent to various
discussions of R2P within the United Nations, the scope became
narrowed down only to refer to situations constituting the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community.7 4 Under the current
understanding, therefore, a situation triggering R2P should fit one of four
crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against
humanity. Among these, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity are also prescribed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute as crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 75 R2P is concerned with protecting the
victims, while the ICC is concerned with punishing the perpetrators of

those crimes. Thus, their inter-related tasks in relation to atrocity crimes

74. See Rim, supra note 17, at 151-53. The 2001 ICISS Report and the 2004 SecretaryGeneral's Report (A More Secure World) delineated two situations entailing R2P: situations
invoking R2P in general, and situations permitting military intervention under the notion of R2P.
By contrast, he 2005 Secretary-General's Report (In Larger Freedom) and the 2005 World
Summit Outcome referred only to specific situations where military intervention can be invoked.
See Rim, supra note 28, at 40. Situations where R2P is applicable:
Situations Invoking R2P in Situations
permitting
General
military
Intervention
Under the Notion of R2P
2001 ICISS Report
Where a population
is When there is large-scale
suffering serious harm, as a loss of life, actual or
result
of internal
war, apprehended, with genocidal
insurgency, repression or state intent or not, which is the
failure,
product either of deliberate
state sanction, or state
neglect or inability to act, or
a failed state situation; or
large-scale ethnic cleansing,
actual
or
apprehended,
whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion,
acts of terror or rape.

2004 SG Report (A More
Secure World)

2005 SG Report
(In Larger Freedom)
2005
World
Summit
Outcome
75.

When people are suffering
from avoidable catastrophe:
mass murder and rape, ethnic
cleansing
by
forcible
expulsion and terror, and
deliberate
starvation
and
exposure to disease,

The event of genocide and
other large-scale killing,
ethnic cleansing, or serious
violations of international
humanitarian law which
sovereign governments have
proved
powerless
or
unwilling to prevent.
Genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
Genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity.

Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 5.
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are to protect the victims and punish the perpetrators.7 6
These two frameworks share a common purpose and foundation.
Above all, R2P and the ICC are both guided by the same moral
commitment to address and ultimately end atrocity crimes. 77 As explicitly
noted in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, the ICC was established to
address the continuing prevalence of "unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity" and to bring an "end to impunity for
the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of
such crimes." 78 R2P was also introduced in response to the request of the
then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to devise an effective reaction
toward human rights tragedy, recalling the failures of the international
community to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the
1990s. 79 More fundamentally, the normative grounds or founding
premises of the two frameworks are identical: pursuit of humanity and
justice through international cooperation. As noted in the preamble of the
Rome Statute mentioned above, the ICC is associated with a claim to
represent humanity in furthering its basic principles. Likewise, emerging
in the tradition of "just war" theory and intervention, R2P is built on ideas
of prevention, protection and remedial response that exemplify
humanitarian action. 80
76. Ramesh Thakur & Vesselin Popovski, The Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute:
The ParallelErosion of Sovereignty and Impunity, I GLOBAL COMMUNITY Y.B. INT'L L. & JURIS.
39, 41 (2007).
77.

CTR. FOR

INT'L

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

NORTHWESTERN

UNIV.

SCH.

OF LAW,

THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AMERICA'S NEW

PRIORITIES, CONFERENCE REPORT 7 (2008), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2PICC%2Oconference%20report-March%202008.pdf (last visited July 19, 2016).
78. Kofi Quashigah, The Future of the InternationalCriminalCourt in African Crisis and
Its Relationship with the R2P Project, 21 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 91 (2010).
79. Kofi Annan asked: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic
violations of human fights that offend every precept of our common humanity?" Human Rights
Council, Rep. of the S.C. on the work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/55/1, 37 (Aug. 30,
2000). Before this interpolation, Kofi Annan had raised the issue of the international community's
responsibility to protect in his address to the 54th session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1999. See Press Release, General Assembly, Implications of International Response to
Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General, in Address to General Assembly,
U.N. Press Release GA/9595 (Sept. 20, 1999).
80. Carsten Stahn, Marital Stress or Groundsfor Divorce? Re-Thinking the Relationship
between R2P andInternationalCriminalJustice,26 CRIM. L. F. 13, 15-16 (2015). However, Stahn
noted that the underlying principles of R2P do not necessarily coincide with the goals of
international criminal justice, in the sense that R2P as humanitarian action is victim-focused while
international criminal justice is perpetrator-centered. Id.at 16. According to Stahn, international
criminal justice involves different goals and prioritization than human rights advocacy or
humanitarian relief, being perpetrator-centered and targeted in focus. Id. Stahn criticized that in
the World Summit Outcome Document, the projects have been paired with each other through the
focus on atrocity crimes, without deeper reflection on the merger of these distinct traditions. Id.
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B. ComplementarityPrincipleand Implicationfor Sovereignty
R2P and the ICC also share similarities in the framework for assigning
responsibility to an individual sovereign State and the international
community. Both embrace the principle of complementarity, which
assigns primary responsibility to individual States, while calling for
international action when the State is either unable or unwilling to take
action. R2P requires international actors to defer first to State sovereignty
and then act if and when that State fails to demonstrate good faith in
ending the violence. Accordingly, when a certain situation is considered
under R2P, the U.N. Security Council first calls upon the government to
protect its civilians, before it goes further to authorize the Member States
to engage to protect this population. 8 1 This primary and secondary
responsibility framework of R2P is similar to the complementarity
principle enshrined in the Rome Statute. The ICC assumes jurisdiction
over a case only when the State is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry
out the investigation or prosecution. The ICC's jurisdiction is intended to
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.8 2 Under the
complementarity principle, a case being handled by a competent national
judicial system is not admissible to be dealt with by the ICC.8 3 Thus, in
order to deal with the situation at the international level within both
frameworks, a sovereign State should be proven to be either unwilling or
unable to carry out its responsibility.
R2P and the ICC both channel the involvement of the international
community. R2P induces the international community to protect
civilians, while the ICC internationally prosecutes perpetrators. In this
regard, these frameworks may be seen to entail substantial derogations or
infringement upon the sovereign boundary of the State. 4 However, they
are not in any profound theoretical way against sovereignty.8 5 R2P is
based on the reinterpretation of sovereignty as responsibility, and this is
what justifies a discourse of intervention. The ICC also points to the
relative character of sovereignty by insisting that certain crimes are
international by nature and, therefore, the responsibility of the entire

81.

See sources cited supra note 41.

82.

Rome Statute, supra note 31, pmbl.

83.

Id. art. 17.

84. Thakur & Popovski, supra note 76, at 41 ("Both require substantial derogations of
sovereignty, the first with respect to the norm of non-intervention and the second with respect to
sovereign impunity up to the level of heads of government and state."); see also Michael
Contarino & Selena Lucent, Stopping the Killing: The InternationalCriminalCourtand Juridical
Determinationof the Responsibilityto Protect, I GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 560, 563 (2009).
85. Frederic Mgret, ICC, R2P, and the International Community's Evolving
Interventionist Toolkit, 21 FrNNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 21, 37 (2010).
86. See Rim, supra note 28, at 19-23, at 70-77.
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community.8 7 Transfer of responsibility means neither derogation of
sovereignty, nor infringement of the sovereign boundary of the State.
Instead, both R2P and the ICC emphasize, and thereby reinforce, the
fulfillment of responsibilities of sovereign States. Both norms primarily
require cooperation from sovereign States to fulfill their obligation in
preventing such crimes. Through emphasizing the role of domestic
authorities, these frameworks also strengthen the internal system to
respond to mass atrocities. R2P a priori stresses the role of the
government to protect its population from atrocity crimes. The
international community, in accordance with the second pillar of R2P,
needs to assist the sovereign State in upholding its responsibility, and this
includes offering support for national capacity building. In this context,
the most imperative aspect of R2P is enhancing the domestic system for
human rights protection. The ICC also indirectly stresses the role of
domestic legal institutions to prosecute and punish those responsible for
crimes, and work to end impunity. Domestic proceedings have to be
initiated in order to challenge and avoid the jurisdiction of the ICC. Under
the complementarity principle, therefore, the relationship of the ICC and
the domestic courts is ideally cooperative rather than competitive.8 8 The
former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo also considered that "the absence of
trials before this Court, as a consequence of the89 regular functioning of
national institutions, would be a major success."
The real meaning of R2P lies in enhancing the domestic mechanism
by focusing the international community's attention on the primary
responsibility of the State. Likewise, the ICC impacts the structural
reform of the domestic institution. The case of Colombia is illustrative in
this regard, and its legal reform shows "how complementarity may enable
the ICC to directly assist governments seeking to meet R2P goals." 90 As
such, in an indirect manner, the ICC may promote accountability by
forcing domestic judiciaries to act upon their responsibilities with respect
to R2P. 9 ' The complementarity principle based on both frameworks has
not assumed that intervention prevails over State sovereignty; rather, it
attempts to facilitate the work of the domestic institution by triggering
external pressure on the work of the primary responsible organ in order
to avoid exercise of secondary responsibility by external force. In other
87.

Mgret, supra note 85, at 35. ("Both R2P and the ICC [...] are part of projects to tame

or civilize the power incarnated by sovereignty on the basis of a vigorous cosmopolitan outlook
that emphasizes the transcendent and universal character of obligations owed to human beings.").
88. See generally Malnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law in Action of
the InternationalCriminalCourt, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 387 n.10 (2005).
89. Int'l Crim. Ct. Off. Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of
Complementarity in Practice, at 3, ICC Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA (Mar. 30, 2003).
90. Michael Contarino & Melinda Negr6n-Gonzales, The InternationalCriminalCourt, in
An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect 411, 417 (Gentian Zyberi ed., 2013).
91. Id.
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words, it helps facilitate the exercise of genuine sovereignty as
responsibility.
C. Common Constraints:The Role of the Security Council
Both frameworks share certain political and practical limitations. If a
government factually exercising sovereignty of a State is a perpetrator
accountable for such atrocities, the only way to deal with the situation
within the R2P and ICC frameworks is through determination by the
Security Council. So far, however, the Security Council has not taken
sufficiently clear and strong action in many cases, despite sustained
demands for decisive action from the international community, and has
failed to enforce its words with adequate measures. 92 As the Security
Council only has authority to invoke and implement the secondary
responsibility to protect civilians, actualizing facilitation of R2P may be
obstructed by one negative vote by any of the five permanent member
States of the Security Council, which is sufficient to prevent the adoption
of the draft resolution. 93 The ICC, as much as invoking R2P for external
intervention, relies largely upon the decision of the Security Council. The
ICC is dependent on the Security Council in order to exercise its

jurisdiction over situations occurring in States that are not Party to the
Rome Statute. Moreover, although the Prosecutor may initiate
investigations proprio moto on the basis of information on crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court,9 4 or through referral of a situation by a State
Party, 95 enforcement still largely depends on the Security Council. 96 It
92. See Contarino & Lucent, supra note 84, at 566. Because of this weakness, some authors
argue that determining when a government has failed to protect its citizens need not be the sole
responsibility of the U.N. Security Council, and propose that the ICC could be empowered to
examine any situation of suspected R2P violations through a few revisions of the Rome Statute.
Id. at 568.
93. See generally Contarino & Lucent, supra note 84, at 566. R2P does not create a new
obligation or right for the States to actively engage in matters which primarily fall in the domestic
jurisdiction of a sovereign State. Rim, supra note 17, at 168-70. Instead, it uses the collective
security system in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Id. Accordingly, the only
way to intervene in a situation within the boundary of a sovereign State is through Chapter VII
authorization by the Security Council. Id. Under the current framework, the Security Council is
the main decision maker for taking the R2P principle into action. Id.
94. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 15.
95. Id. art. 14.
96. For instance, in order to enforce the arrest warrant, the ICC can request a State party to
surrender the criminal to the Court's custody. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 89. See generally
Valerie Oosterveld et al., The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 767, 769-75 (2001). If it is based on the Security Council's referral, still the
State concerned is obligated, under the SC resolution, to cooperate with the ICC. If it fails, the
ICC can refer non-compliance to the U.N. Security Council for further action in accordance with
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. However, the U.N. Security Council could also fail to assist in
enforcing the arrest warrants when the adoption of a resolution is vetoed.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss0/3

18

Rim: The Role of the International Criminal Court in Implementing the

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNA7IONAL CRIMINAL COURT

reveals that the ICC, like R2P, must rely upon enforcement mechanisms
97
"which are beyond its control and hardly insulated from politics."
Since R2P and the ICC are dependent on the Security Council's
decision, the discretion of the Security Council could constrain and stall
the works of these two frameworks. Moreover, both frameworks could
be undermined if the Security Council refers atrocity crimes selectively,
such as in Libya but not in Syria. 98 Indeed, recent failures of the Security
Council to invoke the secondary responsibility of the international
community in R2P language with respect to the Syrian situation, or to
refer the situation to the ICC, illustrates the limited ability of the two
frameworks without the support of the powers that dominate the Security
Council, and reflects negatively on the effectiveness of both frameworks.
Syria is witnessing ongoing mass human rights violations by both
government troops and rebels in its four-year civil war, which have
resulted in over 10,000 civilian deaths.9 9 Although the Security Council
emphasized the primary responsibility of the Syrian authorities in its
resolutions,' 0 0 the Council has not yet gone further to adopt a resolution
authorizing taking timely and decisive action, even after the failure of
those who bear the primary responsibility became obvious. In the face of
clear evidence that the government of Syria has failed to protect its
population, being either unable or unwilling, the third pillar of R2P has
not been implemented in the absence of decisive and timely response on
the part of the international community. 101 Despite a global outcry against
the Syrian conflict, hoping for a Security Council referral of the situation
to the ICC, the issue of Security Council intervention (either to protect or
to prosecute) remains hotly contested among permanent Council
members, with Russia and China vetoing Council resolutions. 10 2 The
Syrian case indeed reveals the practical constraint embodied in both the
R2P and ICC frameworks.

97. Contarino & Negr6n-Gonzales, supra note 90, at 426.
98. Id.
99. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69 (2015).
100. S.C. Res. 2165, at 2 (July 14, 2014). ("Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the
Syrian authorities to protect the population in Syria"); S.C. Res. 2139, 9 (Feb. 22, 2014) ("Also
demands that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of
ethnic, religious and confessional communities, and stresses that, in this regard, the primary
responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities").
101. Ved P. Nanda, The Future under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect
After Libya and Syria, 21 MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
102. Russia, China Block Security Council Referral of Syria to ICC, U.N. News Center,
May 22, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/ news/storyasp?NewsID-47860.
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IV. CONVERGENCE OF Two FRAMEWORKS:
ROLE OF THE ICC IN R2P IMPLEMENTATION

While the ICC is frequently noted as a tool for R2P implementation,
less scrutiny has been afforded to examining at which stage the ICC may
effectively exert its influence on the R2P principle. Both frameworks are
concerned with prevention, protection and rebuilding in situations of
mass atrocities. However, although the focus of the ICC could be more
properly described as deterrence, cessation, and reconciliation. 10 3 For
further discussion, this issue is divided into three stages in accordance
with the three specific responsibilities embraced in the initial concept of
R2P.
A. ICC in the Responsibility to Prevent: Prevention and Deterrence
Prevention is the most important dimension of R2P, and one of the
ways R2P distinguishes itself from humanitarian intervention. 104 As
noted in the preamble of the Rome Statute, the ICC aims to "put an end
to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to
the prevention of such crimes." 1 °5 Both R2P and the ICC thus are
concerned with the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. The responsibility
to prevent includes "address[ing] both the root causes and direct causes
of internal conflict and other man-made crises populations at risk."' 106 The
role of the ICC is emphasized in this context in that the threat of criminal
prosecution is anticipated to deter or affect future occurrence of mass
atrocities. Thus, even before its establishment, the ICC was described in
the ICISS Report as one of a range of tools for direct prevention of
atrocity crimes available to the international community. 10 7 Likewise,
individual States also have been stressing the preventative effect of the
ICC in discussing R2P. 10 8 The potential role of the ICC in the
preventative aspect of R2P was repeatedly mentioned in the SecretaryGeneral's Reports. In 2012, the Secretary-General stressed the work of
the ICC in putting an end to impunity for perpetrators, thus contributing
to the prevention of the most serious crimes.' 9 The positive influence of
103.
104.

Quashigah, supra note 78, at 13.
Sheri P. Rosenberg, Responsibilityto Protect:A Frameworkfor Prevention, I GLOBAL
RESP. TO PROTECT 442, 442 (2009).
105. Rome Statute, supra note 31, pmbl.
106. ICISS Report, supra note 12, at xi. Prevention has been emphasized in the initial
comprehensive concept of R2P, thus devices enabling the effective involvement in earlier stage
have been specifically designed. See id. 3.18-3.19.
107. Id. 3.30.
108. Contarino & Negr6n-Gonzales, supranote 90, at 413-15.
109. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response,
29, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
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an international criminal justice system, through and led by the ICC, was
also noted in the development of R2P. 110 In 2015, the Secretary-General
noted prevention of recurrence of atrocity crimes as one of the priorities
for the next decade, and particularly focused on the role of the ICC to
ensure reconciliation and accountability for recovering from atrocities in
the context of the implementation of R2P. 111
Numerous studies have been conducted concerning the effect of the
ICC in preventing atrocity crimes in general (i.e., whether the threat of
ICC prosecution contributes to deterring individuals, groups or
governments from committing mass atrocity crimes). In the early years
of the establishment of the ICC, authors held relatively positive views on
its preventative effects. 112 Yet, under scrutiny, this hopeful prognosis
would seem to rest on anecdotal rather than documented achievement,
and remains somewhat speculative. 113 The belief that the ICC may
contribute to the prevention of atrocity crimes has mainly been based on
the legal deterrence theory in the context of domestic criminal law. From
a utilitarian approach, this belief presumes that humans are rational
decision-makers who conduct cost-benefit calculations prior to deciding
whether or not to engage in acts of crime, and that punishment by a legal
114
system deters future offenders by sufficiently increasing the legal cost.
Accordingly, some argue that the lack of certainty of punishment, which
relies upon States' cooperation for enforcement, would hamper the
1 15
relevance of this argument concerning the deterrent effect of the ICC.

However, it should be noted that this argument might not be readily
applicable to the ICC due to its inherently international setting, since the
ICC focuses on high-level leaders who might be more calculating in
regard to the response of the international community than in regard to
enforcement per se. On the other hand, indictments may also serve as a
disincentive to leaders who would be left with no reason to
110. Id.
111. See U.N. Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/69/981-S/2015/500 (July 13, 2015).
112. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 11 PACE INT'L
L. REV. 319 (1999); Aryeh Neier, Will the InternationalCriminal Court Make a Difference?, 12
HELSINKI MONITOR 163 (2001).

113.

Sheri P. Rosenberg, The Relationship Between the InternationalCriminal Court and

the Prevention of Mass Atrocities, GENOCIDE PREVENTION Now I (Sept. 2012), http://www.

ihgjlm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/0 1/Relationship _ICC Prevention HU.pdf.
114. Tom Buitelaar, The ICC and the Prevention ofAtrocities: CriminologicalPerspectives
3-7 (The Hague Inst. for Glob. Justice, Working Paper No. 8, 2015).
115. Id. at 11-14. Focusing on the potential offender's decision-making process, from a
criminological perspective, Buitelaar argues that "the potential for the ICC to deter future
atrocities is limited [because] it faces obstacles in ensuring the certainty of its legal sanctions and
needs to counter extralegal sanction threats that sometimes encourage criminal behavior." Id. at
14.
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compromise.' 16 Of course, measuring deterrent effect is by its nature
difficult as it deals not with an act that has occurred but with what has not
happened.1 17 In the absence of empirical evidence proving the effect of
deterrence, however, many authors tend to reserve judgment or take a
negative stance.
Since the ICC is still in its formative stage in certain aspects, it may
be premature to assess it as "an instrument of deterrence." 118 However,
prosecution of prominent international criminals before the ICC may
have great symbolic and even normative value. By affirming that such
crimes will be prosecuted in the international court, without impunity or
immunity, the ICC suggests that accountability will always be pursued.
Moreover, trial in the ICC may contribute to the prevention of such
crimes by raising awareness by providing affirmation that certain conduct
constituting atrocity crimes violates the norms of criminal justice of
international society. These aspects may constitute social deterrent
factors which would further the general deterrent effect of the ICC.119 The
ICC may therefore contribute to the prevention of atrocities in the long
term by providing the momentum for a transformative process resulting
in the internalization of norms and creation of self-regulating
communities.120 Although the ICC may not have an immediate deterrent
effect, by establishing a normative environment where atrocity crimes are
no longer tolerated, the work of the ICC may act as a deterrent in the
longer term. 12
Effective prevention of atrocity crimes may require the building of
early warning capabilities to enable a timely response at an earlier stage,
but forming a society in which such crimes are not tolerated would
ultimately be the most effective insurance against such crimes occurring
in the first place. The ICC would contribute to the creation of an atrocityintolerant environment by facilitating the work of national courts towards
ending impunity. It is indeed likely that the Court's greatest preventative
impact results from its interactions with and impact upon national legal
systems. In this way, the ICC would take a certain role in implementing
R2P in particular in the context of prevention. Moreover, as Contarino
116.
117.

ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 33, at 22.
Alexander, supra note 36, at 2.

118. Contarino & Negr6n-Gonzales, supra note 90, at 431.
119. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 446. Jo and Simmons present empirical data
concerning the impact of both prosecutorial and social deterrence factors on the number of
civilians killed. Distinguishing between 'prosecutorial deterrence' which refers to "a direct
consequence of legal punishment," and 'social deterrence' which refers to "a consequence of the
broader social milieu in which actors operate," they assert that social deterrence could also be a
powerful tool, rendering the deterrent effect of the ICC as conditionally positive. Id.
120. Buitelaar, supra note 114, at 14.
121. Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do InternationalCriminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
HumanitarianAtrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006).
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and Negr6n-Gonzales put it, "[b]y actively encouraging national
capacity-building, it could potentially strengthen deterrence while
enhancing the R2P idea that States have the primary responsibility to
prevent mass atrocity crimes and to prosecute those who carry them
out. ' 122 In this sense, the ICC may be considered a mechanism for
prevention of atrocity crimes in the course of implementing R2P.
B. ICC in the Responsibility to React: Protection through NonMilitary Intervention
The ICC can be used in the course of implementing the responsibility
to react. Whether the ICC can be used as an international judicial
response which can either support or replace military options may be a
case-specific question. However, it is certain that the international
community can uphold its responsibility through non-military measures
in accordance with the third pillar of R2P implementation. In this sense,
international criminal prosecution could be a form of non-military
intervention. 123 In practice, Libya was the first case in which referral to
the ICC was expressly associated with the R2P concept. It illustrated that
the jurisdiction exercised by the ICC may not remain a mechanism to be
applied after the occurrence of certain events, but may be used as a tool
ensuring implementation of the responsibility to protect in the face of
ongoing violence and hostilities. 124 Moreover, the ICC prosecution may
also constitute an effective reaction. Although there was no formal
referral by the Security Council, the Prosecutor of the ICC warned that
the worsening situation in the post-election crisis in C6te d'Ivoire could
amount to the crimes that fall in the jurisdiction of the ICC, and expressed
its intention to initiate investigation. The former ICC Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo mentioned C6te d'Ivoire as a case deterrence has
started to show its effect, "where the prospect of prosecution of those
using hate speech is deemed to have kept the main actors under some
level of control."'' 25 As a matter of fact, in the case of C6te d'Ivoire, the
threat of prosecution by the ICC supposedly led to the cessation of certain
actions. Of course such a response may not apply to all events, as
evidenced by the negative examples in many other cases.
122. Contarino & Negr6n-Gonzales, supra note 90, at 431-432.
123. ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supranote 33, at 21.
124. Carsten Stahn, Libya, the InternationalCriminal Court and Complementarity: A Test
for 'SharedResponsibility', 10 J. INT'L CraM. Jus. 325, 326 (2012) (assessing response to situation

in Libya and noting "the jurisdiction of the ICC was [therefore] not solely an ex post facto
mechanism, but at least partially an instrument to constrain ongoing violence and secure
accountability in the context of hostilities.").
125. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The Role of the International Community in Assisting the
InternationalCriminal Court to Secure Justice and Accountability, in 7 CONFRONTING GENOCIDE,
279, 288 (Ren6 Provost & Payam Akhavan eds., 2011).
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Another somewhat uncertain case on the effect of the ICC referral can
be found in respect of the DPRK. In 2014, when the General Assembly
prepared a draft for the Resolution 69/188 which includes its decision "to
submit the report of the commission of inquiry to the Security Council,
and encourages the Council to consider the relevant conclusions and
recommendations of the commission and take appropriate action to
ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the
situation in the DPRK to the ICC,' 126 the DPRK vehemently demanded
that the reference to ICC referral be removed from the General Assembly
resolution. While at least in part this must have been due to the DPRK's
peculiarity of being under the rule of an absolute "Supreme Dignity,"
where the very notion that the absolute leader could be subject to
punishment is considered blasphemous, it does show that even the DPRK
is responding sensitively to the prospect of being referred to the ICCregardless of the actual possibility of implementation. Subsequently, the
DPRK proceeded to make a counteroffer promising improvements of
human rights in return for the omission of the reference. As their request
has not been accepted, however, the DPRK reject both ways for
engagement and pressure. Nevertheless, this is an undeniable example
demonstrating the effect of the threat of ICC prosecution in respect of the
protection of human rights pursuant to the objectives of R2P.
Meanwhile, consideration of a situation by the ICC would enhance the
credibility of allegation concerning the commission of crimes with which
both frameworks are concerned, and thereby facilitate the Security
Council to take decisive actions under R2P. Taking steps towards
investigation is not a judicial decision per se, nor recognition of the
commission of crimes. But it could politically affect the decision of the
Security Council, a political organ, apart from any subsequent judicial
decision. 127 Moreover, it would facilitate the national authorities to
undertake their primary responsibility. Thus, the ICC could be considered
in connection with the second pillar of R2P which emphasizes the
responsibility of the international community to assist States in protecting
populations; and also the third pillar which defines the responsibility of
the international community to take collective action in a timely and
decisive manner.
C. ICC in the Responsibility to Rebuild: Reconciliation and
TransitionalJustice
One of the most important uses of the ICC in the context of R2P
implementation pertains to facilitating the reconciliation and
126.
127.

G.A. Res. 69/188, 8 (Dec. 18, 2014).
Contarino & Lucent, supra note 84, at 566-68.
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reconstruction of war-torn societies. R2P implies the responsibility not
just to prevent and react, "but to follow through and rebuild" with "a
genuine commitment to helping build a durable peace, and promoting
good governance and sustainable development." 128 The effects of atrocity
crimes are usually deep and long-lasting that can impede peace and
reconciliation. Finding those responsible, and creating an opportunity for
victims and perpetrators to reconcile, becomes crucial for reconstruction
as well as for ultimate prevention. Emphasizing that "ending impunity is
neither optional nor negotiable," the Secretary-General affirms that
"accountability not only contributes to preventing the recurrence of
atrocity crimes but also makes national institutions stronger and more
legitimate."' 129 Security Council Resolution 1674, which affirmed the
R2P principle in relation to the protection of civilians in armed conflict,
explicitly included "ending impunity through prosecuting those
responsible for atrocity crimes" among the specific steps to be taken by
30
States and the international community in order to protect civilians.
However, inability or unwillingness of the domestic legal system can
generally be presumed in a situation where R2P is invoked. Moreover, as
the cases of Afghanistan and Libya show, domestic legal institutions
established post-conflict would tend to lean toward a certain side of the
armed conflict. In order to build national resilience to prevent atrocity
crimes, avoiding possible cause for future conflict is imperative. As is
shown in the case of Egypt, national prosecution could sow the seeds of
trouble, and could serve only the victor's justice. 13 1 The role of the ICC
is huge in this respect. Indeed, the ICISS has already noted that "the
establishment of the International Criminal Court is also to be welcomed
as a measure to avoid the accusations of double standards, or 'victor's
justice,' which are periodically aimed at the specialist tribunals just
128.

ICISS Report, supra note 12, at 39. These extended responsibilities were not

specifically noted in the 2005 Outcome Document. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note
15. However, the Secretary-General's Report, which developed the three pillars of the R2P

implementation mechanism, again brought forward the initial frame in the ICISS Report. U.N.
Secretary-General, supra note 18.
129. U.N. Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, 20, U.N. Doc. A/69/981-S/2015/500 (July 13, 2015).
130. CTR. FOR INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 77, at I1.
131.

See, e.g., M. C14ERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

945-46 (M. Cherif. Bassiouni et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012); Anna Uger, Examining the Dangers of a
"Victor's Justice" Trial Through the Lens of the Trials of Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein,
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY EREPOSITORY (2013), http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/
174/; Reem Abou-E1-Fadl, Beyond Conventional TransitionalJustice: Egypt's 2011 Revolution
and the Absence of PoliticalWill, 6 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 318 (2012); Mohamed A. Arafa,
The Unexpected Trials of Egyptian Leaders: Is It a Question of Law or Politics, 12 US-CHINA L.
REV. 467, 467-68 (2015); Victor's Justice: Muhammad Morsi is found guilty, again, ECONOMIST,

May 16, 2015, http://www.economist. com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21651552-muhammadmorsi-found-guilty-again-victors-justice.
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referred to." 132 Use of the ICC can thus function as a sort of arm's length
mechanism of transparency whereby the authority established by the
"winning side" in a conflict is not subject to accusations of suspect
administration of justice.
Responsibility to rebuild includes the pursuit and achievement of
transitional justice. Transitional justice has been defined as "the
conception of justice associated with periods of political change,
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of
repressive predecessor regimes."' 33 Originally, "justice, in this context,
was generally conceived in terms of the establishment of trials and truth
commissions to address past human rights violations."' 134 However,
starting from the mid-1990s, the parameters of the concept of "justice"
embedded in traditional understandings of transitional justice have been
expanded beyond its original focus on "legal responses" to reflect broader
notions ofjustice.135 Transitional justice consists of both judicial and nonjudicial processes and mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives,
facilitating initiatives in respect of the right to truth, delivering
reparations, institutional reform and national consultations.136
Nonetheless, criminal prosecution remains the unrivaled means of
resolving the problems innate to past human rights violations, in
particular when such crimes amount to mass atrocity. In this regard, the
ICC would function as a transitional justice mechanism. 137 Evaluation
based on the rule of law, to uphold international human rights and
criminal law which is universal in its character, may facilitate internal
reconciliation along international standards. In this regard, the ICC could
be the ideal mechanism to deal with the situation objectively and solely
132. ICISS Report, supra note 12, at 24.
133. Ruti G. Teitel, TransitionalJustice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003).
134. Rene Jeffery & Hun Joon Kim, New Horizons: Transitional Justice in the AsiaPacific, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INTHE ASIA-PACIFIC 1, 4 (Rende Jeffery & Hun Joon Kim eds.

2014).
135.
136.

Id. at5
U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, United Nations

Approach to Transitional Justice 2 (Mar.

2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/filesfJ_

GuidanceNote March_201OFINAL.pdf.
137. To some extent, genuine transitional justice can only be achieved when it follows
norms that the members of the society accept and commit to, and domestic institutions can also
work for achieving transitional justice in accordance with the rule of law. Thus, one may critically
view the appropriateness of the ICC as the mechanism of transitional justice, in that its negative
effect would tend to impede the attainment of transitional justice's presumed end goals of
sustainable and just peace, as observed in Africa. See Obiaro Chinedu Okafor & Uchechukwu
Ngwaba, The InternationalCriminalCourt as a 'TransitionalJustice'Mechanismin Africa: Some
CriticalReflections, 9 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 90,90-98 (2015). However, in reality, building

up transitional justice would be a difficult task for a war-tom society, and could easily fail to be
objective. See also Steven C. Roach, Should the InternationalCriminal Court Impose Justice?, 7
YALE J. INT'L AFF. 64, 66, 68-69 (2012).
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based on rule of law. In this way the ICC can be a strong tool to work
toward the society's integration and reconciliation. The reconstruction
phase is the most important stage for R2P implementation, and the one
where the ICC and R2P mechanism can most effectively work together.
V.

ROLE OF THE

ICC IN NORMATIVE CONSOLIDATION OF R2P

The ICC may work for consolidation of the R2P's normative
structure: firstly, through clarifying the elements of crimes which trigger
implementing R2P, secondly, through enhancing the legitimacy of R2P
through its jurisprudence by proving that R2P implementation aims to
achieve international criminal justice.
A. Clarifyingthe Elements of Crime
Besides the role of the ICC in implementing the R2P, the ICC could
also facilitate the normative consolidation of R2P through clarification of
meaning and applicable situation. The Rome Statute primafacieprovides
the definition of applicable situations for R2P, specifying what elements
of action constitute a situation invoking implementation of the R2P
notion. As noted, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are
the common focus of both R2P and the ICC. Thus, what constitutes these
crimes is determined by the elements prescribed in the Rome Statutes
through Articles 6 to 8, notwithstanding the fact that the definition of
genocide is originally based on Article 2 of the 1959 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.' 38 The Rome
Statute is the result of long-awaited discussions in the international
community, based on the works of the International Law Commission.
Accordingly, the definitions provided in the Rome Statute have become
the most authoritative construal of those crimes. 139 By specifying the
relevant elements constituting these crimes,14 0 the Rome Statute helps
clarify which situations invoke R2P. As such, the ICC helps to identify
what situations can be considered under R2P.
B. Enhancing Legitimacy of R2P
R2P has frequently been referred to as an emerging norm of the
138. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 11, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
139. Menno T. Kamminga, Lesson Learned from Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HuM. RTs. Q. 940, 946 (2001).
140. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, Rep. of the Preparatory Comm'n for
the Int'l Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000).
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international community. 14 1 However, this "emerging norm" is not
intended to create any new "legal" obligation imposed upon States. To be
clear, R2P is a mechanism which facilitates the collective security system
embodied in the U.N. Charter. In this sense, it is a priori the political
initiative that gathers the political will of the international community.
By providing constitutive elements as prescribed in the Rome Statute, the
ICC can minimize the possibility for arbitrary application of R2P.
Moreover, it can also resolve the underlying criticism that R2P could be
selectively employed based on political determination. This relates to
enhancing the legitimacy of enacting R2P in all phases: not only the
implementation phase but also commencing with its initial determination
phase. Moreover, through the work of the ICC, the emergence of a system
of international criminal justice would have a positive influence on the
development of R2P. 142 As noted by Buitelaar, "the ICC can
constructively contribute to a normative shift toward accountability and
a change in international rules of legitimacy."' 14 3 This role will continue
as accumulation of ICC jurisprudence helps clarify what constitutes
specific atrocity crimes, thereby strengthening the R2P's normative
structure. 144 Accordingly, the ICC could be one of the arenas that
influence the process of consolidating R2P in the international legal
community. 14 5 Meanwhile, and vice versa, application of the R2P
principle in a specific situation may also facilitate prosecution, and help
achieving international criminal justice.' 46 For instance, when a certain
situation is dealt with in terms of the R2P principle, this prima facie
assumes, and then confirms, the commission of an international crime.
As noted by Mrgret, it would create an environment that is politically
more hospitable to prosecutions. 14 7 Accordingly, R2P may also trigger an
8
international consensus on the work of the ICC.14

141. Jennifer Welsh, Implementing the 'Responsibility to Protect', OXFORD INST. FOR
ETHICS, L. & ARMED CONFLICT (2009).
142. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response,
29, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
143. Buitelaar, supra note 114, abstract.
144. Contarino & Negr6n-Gonzales, supra note 90, at 415.
145. Michael Contarino et al., The InternationalCriminalCourt and Consolidationof the
Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm, 4 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 275 passim
(2012).
146. Carsten Stahn, Marital Stress or Groundsfor Divorce? Rethinking the Relationship
Between R2P and the InternationalCriminalJustice, 26, 26, 28-29 CRIM. L.F. 13 (2015).
147. Mdgret, supra note 85, at 30.
148.

CTR. FOR INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 13.
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VI. CONCLUSION

It has already been a decade since the international community agreed
on the basic principle of R2P. R2P reaffirms the primary responsibility
of the sovereign State as innate in the concept of sovereignty, while
emphasizing the residual responsibility of the international community to
protect a population from threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The ICC, established in 2002,
exercises jurisdiction over atrocity crimes that correspond to situations
invoking R2P. As has been discussed, atrocity crimes considered as
invoking R2P-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,
except ethnic cleansing-fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. R2P and
the ICC are both remarkable developments in efforts to prevent and
respond to mass atrocities in the new millennium, and represent the sort
of innovative response that the international community has been seeking
for centuries.
R2P and the ICC embrace the principle of complementarity, which
assigns primary responsibility to individual States, while calling for
international action when the State is either unable or unwilling to take
action. R2P facilitates gathering the political will of the international
community in a prompt response to protect people at risk, while the ICC
provides a juridical mechanism to punish those who commit such crimes.
Both frameworks channel the involvement of the international
community. However, at the same time, through emphasizing the role of
domestic authorities, these frameworks also strengthen the domestic
capacity to respond to mass atrocities. Meanwhile, if a government
factually exercising sovereignty of a State is a perpetrator accountable in
such atrocities, the only way to deal with such situations within the R2P
and ICC frameworks is through determination by the Security Council,
meaning that both the R2P and ICC frameworks share political and
practical limitations.
The Rome Statute is the basis for the implementation of R2P as it
defines the crimes that should be dealt with under the R2P framework.
The ICC and R2P are both concerned with prevention, protection and
rebuilding in situations of mass atrocities. The ICC can be engaged as a
tool for the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, as well
as the responsibility to rebuild. As Bassiouni noted, "[tihe pursuit of
justice and accountability fulfills [the] fundamental human needs and
expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of
future conflicts." 14 9 For societies recovering from atrocities, the role of
the ICC is particularly important in holding perpetrators accountable and

149. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability
over Realpolitik, 35 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 192 (2003).
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supporting national legal mechanisms. 150
The ICC may also contribute to reinforcing the normative framework
of R2P by further clarifying the definitions of the crimes that are subject
to the notion of R2P, and also by adjudicating specific cases in practice.
Meanwhile, considering a given situation under R2P would facilitate the
work of the ICC in accordance with international criminal justice. When
a given situation is considered in terms of R2P, there already exists in a
certain sense an assumption of the commission of crimes. Thus, by
creating a consensual environment more hospitable to prosecution, it
would help achieve the ultimate goal of criminal justice. 15 The ICC is
not a simplistic tool utilized at a specific stage of R2P implementation,
but is rather a complementary and interrelated framework, which affects
all aspects of R2P.

150. U.N. Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, 66, U.N. Doc. A/69/981 -S/2015/500 (July 13, 2015).
151. Mgret, supra note 85, at 30.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss0/3

30

